COMBINED ARMS OPERATIONS
IN URBAN TERRAIN
HEADQUARTERS
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
By Order of the Secretary of the Army:
ERIC K. SHINSEKI General, United States Army
Chief of Staff
Official:
JOEL B. HUDSON Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army 0205901
DISTRIBUTION:
FIELD MANUAL HEADQUARTERS
No. 3-06.11 DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON, DC, 28 February 2002
COMBINED ARMS OPERATIONS
IN URBAN TERRAIN
CONTENTS
Page
Preface... x
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Section I. General Considerations ...1-11-1. Definitions...1-11-2. Full Spectrum Operations/Urban Operations Concept ...1-41-3. Tactical Challenges ...1-51-4. Importance of Urban Areas...1-71-5. Fundamentals of Urban Operations ...1-91-6. Characteristics of Urban Operations ...1-121-7. Urban Battle Space...1-15Section II. Special Considerations ...1-171-8. Weapons Considerations...1-171-9. Target Engagement ...1-181-10. Munitions and Equipment ...1-191-11. Noncombatants...1-191-12. Disease Prevention ...1-221-13. Stress ...1-221-14. Fratricide Avoidance...1-231-15. Situational Awareness...1-241-16. Media ...1-251-17. Unexploded Ordnance...1-26
CHAPTER 2. URBAN ANALYSIS
Section I. Models of Urban Areas ...2-12-1. General Urban Characteristics ...2-12-2. Description of Urban Areas Worldwide ...2-2
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.__________________________
Page
Section II. Terrain and Weather Analyses ...2-32-3. Urban Zones and Street Patterns ...2-32-4. Special Terrain Considerations ...2-92-5. Special Weather Considerations ...2-122-6. Analysis of Other Characteristics ...2-132-7. Aperture Analysis ...2-132-8. Questions for Commanders and Leaders ...2-15Section III. Urban Building Analysis...2-152-9. Types of Mass-Construction Buildings...2-162-10. Types of Framed Buildings...2-202-11. Floor Plans… ...2-242-12. Residential Areas ...2-272-13. Characteristics of Buildings ...2-292-14. Distribution of Building Types ...2-29Section IV. Urban Threat Evaluation ...2-312-15. Operational Factors ...2-312-16. Threat ...2-342-17. Projected Threat Capabilities ...2-382-18. Modern Urban Battle Analysis ...2-39
CHAPTER 3. URBAN COMBAT SKILLS
Page
3-21. Considerations for Entry ...3-273-22. Techniques for Entering Buildings and Clearing Rooms ...3-283-23. Reflexive Shooting...3-353-24. Target Discrimination ...3-393-25. Movement Within a Building...3-393-26. Verbal Commands and Signals ...3-453-27. Safety and Force Protection ...3-46Section IV. Fighting Positions ...3-473-28. Hasty Fighting Position...3-473-29. Prepared Fighting Position...3-503-30. Target Acquisition...3-603-31. Defense Against Flame Weapons and Incendiary
Munitions ...3-623-32. Defense Against Enhanced Flame Weapons...3-63Section V. Navigation in Urban Areas ...3-653-33. Military Maps...3-663-34. Global Positioning Systems ...3-663-35. Aerial Photographs...3-67Section VI. Camouflage ...3-673-36. Application...3-673-37. Use of Shadows...3-673-38. Color and Texture ...3-69
CHAPTER 4. OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
Page
Section IV. Offensive Framework and Types of Attacks ...4-154-17. Offensive Framework...4-154-18. Hasty Attack...4-164-19. Deliberate Attack ...4-17Section V. Brigade Offensive Operations...4-174-20. Task Organization ...4-174-21. Assess...4-194-22. Shape ...4-204-23. Dominate ...4-214-24. Types of Offensive Operations ...4-214-25. Transition ...4-29Section VI. Battalion Task Force Offensive Operations...4-294-26. Task Organization ...4-304-27. Deliberate Attack ...4-314-28. Movement to Contact...4-354-29. Infiltration ...4-364-30. Attack of a Village ...4-384-31. Route Security and Clearance ...4-384-32. Nodal Attack ...4-40Section VII. Company Team Attack of an Urban Area...4-414-33. Task Organization ...4-424-34. Deliberate Attack ...4-444-35. Isolate an Urban Objective...4-464-36. Assault a Building ...4-494-37. Attack of a Block or Group of Buildings ...4-514-38. Hasty Attack...4-524-39. Movement to Contact and Reconnaissance ...4-534-40. Seizure of Key Urban Terrain ...4-554-41. Direct Fire Planning and Control ...4-57Section VIII. Platoon Attack of an Urban Area ...4-614-42. Task Organization (Platoon Attack of a Building) ...4-614-43. Movement in Urban Terrain ...4-634-44. Attacking in Urban Terrain ...4-644-45. Platoon Assault of a Building ...4-664-46. Consolidation and Reorganization ...4-68
CHAPTER 5. DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS
Page
Section II. Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Troops and Time Available,
Civil Considerations...5-35-4. Mission...5-35-5. Enemy ...5-35-6. Terrain and Weather...5-45-7. Time Available...5-75-8. Troops Available...5-75-9. Civil Considerations...5-7Section III. Defensive Framework and Organization ...5-75-10. Defensive Framework ...5-75-11. Command and Control ...5-85-12. Organization and Preparation of the Defense ...5-105-13. Priorities of Work...5-16Section IV. Brigade Defensive Operations ...5-185-14. Defensive Planning ...5-185-15. Integrating the Urban Area into the Defense ...5-195-16. Nodal Defense...5-20Section V. Battalion Defensive Operations ...5-22
5-17. Employment of Combat and Combat Support
PageCHAPTER 6. SNIPER AND COUNTERSNIPER TACTICS, TECHNIQUES,
AND PROCEDURES
Section I. Employment of Snipers...6-16-1. Sniper Capabilities ...6-16-2. Employment Considerations ...6-26-3. Commander's Responsibilities to the Sniper...6-5Section II. Countering the Urban Sniper ...6-66-4. Types of Enemy Snipers and Their Capabilities...6-66-5. The Law of Land Warfare Applied to Snipers...6-86-6. Sniper Awareness...6-96-7. Planning Sniper Countermeasures ...6-96-8. Countersniper Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures ...6-11
CHAPTER 7. EMPLOYMENT AND EFFECTS OF WEAPONS
7-1. Effectiveness of Weapons and Demolitions ...7-17-2. Rifle, Carbine, and Squad Automatic Weapon ...7-27-3. Medium and Heavy Machine Guns (7.62-mm and
Caliber .50)...7-47-4. Grenade Launchers, 40-mm (M203 and MK 19)...7-77-5. Light and Medium Recoilless Weapons ...7-97-6. Antitank Guided Missiles...7-177-7. Flame Weapons ...7-207-8. Hand Grenades ...7-237-9. Mortars ...7-267-10. 25-mm Automatic Gun ...7-287-11. Tank Cannon ...7-317-12. Artillery and Naval Gunfire ...7-367-13. Aerial Weapons...7-377-14. Demolitions ...7-397-15. Common Effects of Urban Combat...7-39
CHAPTER 8. OBSTACLES, MINES, AND DEMOLITIONS
Page
Section IV. Field Expedient Breaching of Common Urban Barriers...8-198-8. Force Protection ...8-198-9. Breaching Reinforced and Nonreinforced Exterior Walls ...8-208-10. Breaching Interior Walls and Partitions...8-208-11. Door-Breaching Charges...8-22
CHAPTER 9. EMPLOYMENT OF ATTACK AND ASSAULT/CARGOHELICOPTERS
9-1. Support for Ground Maneuver Units ...9-19-2. Role During Urban Operations. ...9-19-3. Command and Control ...9-49-4. Maneuver Graphic Aids ...9-49-5. Identifying Friendly Positions, Marking Locations, and
Acquiring Targets ...9-59-6. Attack Helicopter Target Engagement...9-109-7. Air Ground Integration in the Hasty Attack/Close Fight...9-129-8. Employment of Assault/Cargo Helicopters ...9-189-9. Aviation Urban Operations Risk Assessment ...9-20
CHAPTER 10. FIRES
10-1. Brigade Fire Support for Urban Operations...10-110-2. Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and
Intelligence (C4I) ...10-110-3. Mission Support of Offensive and Defensive Operations ...10-210-4. Acquisition Platforms ...10-1610-5. Meteorological and Survey Requirements ...10-1710-6. Delivery Assets ...10-1810-7. Tactical Air ...10-1810-8. Nonlethal Means ...10-1810-9. Artillery Used in Direct Fire ...10-19
CHAPTER 11. MOBILITY, COUNTERMOBILITY, SURVIVABILITY
11-1. General ...11-111-2. Mission Analysis...11-111-3. Support Products ...11-211-4. Engineer Staff Planning Checklist (Brigade and Below)...11-411-5. Reconnaissance and Surveillance Planning Considerations ...11-611-6. Mobility Planning Considerations ...11-611-7. Countermobility Planning Considerations ...11-911-8. Survivability Planning Considerations...11-10
CHAPTER 12. COMBAT SUPPORT
Page
12-3. Air Defense Artillery ...12-512-4. Engineers...12-712-5. Military Police...12-812-6. Communications ...12-9
CHAPTER 13. COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
Section I. General...13-113-1. Guidelines ...13-113-2. Principal Functions ...13-113-3. Supply and Movement Functions ...13-413-4. Company Resupply Operations...13-613-5. Load Planning and Management...13-813-6. Other Combat Service Support Tactics, Techniques,
and Procedures ...13-1013-7. Personnel Services ...13-1213-8. Deceased Personnel...13-12Section II. Combat Health Support ...13-1313-9. Medical Considerations for the Battalion Staff...13-1313-10. Considerations for the Combat Medic
(Trauma Specialist) ...13-1513-11. Considerations for the Battalion Physician’s Assistant and
Command Surgeon...13-2113-12. Battalion Aid Station Operations ...13-2313-13. Precombat Medical Checklists...13-25Section III. Legal Aspects of Urban Operations...13-2713-14. Civilian Impact in the Battle Area ...13-2713-15. Limits of Authority ...13-2813-16. Diversion of Military Resources ...13-2813-17. Health and Welfare ...13-2813-18. Law and Order...13-2913-19. Public Affairs Officer and Media Relations ...13-2913-20. Civil Affairs Units and Psychological Operations ...13-2913-21. Provost Marshall ...13-3013-22. Commanders’ Legal Authority and Responsibilities ...13-30
CHAPTER 14. STABILITY OPERATIONS AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS
Page
14-8. Conduct Area Security Patrols ...14-1214-9. Conduct Convoy Escort ...14-1514-10. Open and Clear Routes ...14-2014-11. Conduct Reserve Force Mission ...14-2014-12. Cordon and Search ...14-20Section II. Support Operations ...14-2614-13. Types of Support Operations ...14-2614-14. Forms of Support Operations ...14-2614-15. Phases of Support Operations ...14-27Section III. Transition to Combat Operations ...14-2714-16. Plan for Contingencies ...14-2814-17. Balanced Mindset...14-2814-18. Combat Skills Training ...14-28
APPENDIX A. URBAN OPERATIONS UNDER RESTRICTIVE
CONDITIONS ... A-1APPENDIX B. URBAN OPERATIONS UNDER CONDITIONS OF
LIMITED VISIBILITY ... B-1APPENDIX C. LIGHT INFANTRY AND ARMORED VEHICLE
TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES ... C-1APPENDIX D. INFORMATION OPERATIONS... D-1APPENDIX E. COALITION OPERATIONS ... E-1APPENDIX F. WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, TOXIC
INDUSTRIAL MATERIALS, AND THE USE OF
OBSCURATION ...F-1APPENDIX G. INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS CHECKLISTS
FOR URBAN OPERATIONS ... G-1APPENDIX H. LESSONS LEARNED FROM MODERN
URBAN COMBAT... H-1APPENDIX I. PLATOON URBAN OPERATIONS KIT AND TACTICS,
TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES FOR MARKING
BUILDINGS AND ROOMS ... I-1APPENDIX J. SUBTERRANEAN OPERATIONS ... J-1APPENDIX K. TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES FOR
THE EMPLOYMENT OF MORTARS ON
PREFACE
Worldwide urban growth and the shift of populations from rural to urban areas haveaffected Army operations. Urban areas will most probably constitute future battlefields.All major Army operations most likely include urban operations (UO) in the foreseeablefuture.
There is a high probability that the US Army may be engaged by threat forces that areintermingled with the civilian population. Units using the tactics, techniques, andprocedures (TTP) outlined in this manual are bound by the specific rules of engagement(ROE) issued by their headquarters and the laws of land warfare.
This manual provides brigade and battalion commanders and staffs, companycommanders, small-unit leaders, and individual Infantrymen with considerations andcombined arms TTP for conducting full-spectrum urban operations (offense, defense,stability, and support). Some techniques for dealing with insurgents and terrorists orsimilar threats are included; however, the manuals which best address these issues areFM 7-98 and FM 90-8. This manual may also be used as a reference for other combat,combat support and combat service support commanders, leaders, and staffs that will berequired to support combined arms urban operations.
The proponent of this publication is the US Army Infantry School. Send commentsand recommendations to doctrine@benning.army.mil or on DA Form 2028 directly toCommandant, US Army Infantry School, ATTN: ATSH-ATD, Fort Benning, Georgia31905-5410.
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
“The rapid growth of the number and size of urban centers, especiallyin regions of political instability, increases the likelihood that US forceswill be called upon to conduct MOUT.”
Defense Science Board, October 1996
It is estimated that by the year 2010, seventy-five percent of theworld’s population will live in urban areas. Urban areas are expected tobe the future battlefield and combat in urban areas cannot be avoided.This manual provides commanders, leaders, and staffs at brigade leveland below with a discussion of the principles of urban operations andtactics, techniques, and procedures for fighting in urban areas.
Section I. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
Urban operations (UO) are not new to the US Army. Throughout its history the Army hasfought an enemy on urban terrain. What is new is that urban areas and urban populationshave grown significantly during the late twentieth century and have begun to exert amuch greater influence on military operations. The worldwide shift from a rural to anurban society and the requirement to transition from combat to stability and supportoperations and vice-versa have affected the US Army’s doctrine. The brigade will be theprimary headquarters around which units will be task-organized to perform UO.Companies, platoons, and squads will seldom conduct UO independently, but will mostprobably conduct assigned missions as part of a battalion task force urban operation. Thissection provides the necessary background information that facilitates an understandingof how higher level commanders plan and conduct UO.
1-1. DEFINITIONS
Terms specific to UO are defined herein.
a. Urban Operations. UO are operations planned and conducted in an area ofoperations (AO) that includes one or more urban areas. An urban area consists of atopographical complex where man-made construction or high population density is thedominant feature. UO usually occur when—
• The assigned objective lays within an urban area and cannot be bypassed.
• The urban area is key (or decisive) in setting and or shaping the conditions forcurrent or future operations.
• An urban area is between two natural obstacles and cannot be bypassed.
• The urban area is in the path of a general advance and cannot be surroundedor bypassed.
• Political or humanitarian concerns require the control of an urban area ornecessitate operations within it.
• Occupation, seizure, and control of the urban area will deny the threat controlof the urban area and the ability to impose its influence on both friendlymilitary forces and the local civilian population. Therefore, friendly forces canretain the initiative and dictate the conditions for future operations.
b. METT-TC. The tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) the commander selectsfor each mission, whether in open or urban terrain, are always dependent upon the factorsof mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available. Traditionally, the acronym“METT-T” has been used to help leaders remember this set of factors as they plan amission. An effect of the increasing importance of urban areas is the addition of civilconsiderations (METT-TC).
c. Urban Combat. These offensive and defensive operations are the part of UO thatinclude a high density of Infantry-specific tasks. Urban combat operations are conductedto defeat an enemy on urban terrain who may be intermingled with noncombatants.Because of this intermingling, and the necessity to limit collateral damage, the rules ofengagement (ROE) and the restrictions placed on the use of combat power may be morerestrictive than under other combat conditions.
d. Categories of Urban Areas. An urban area is a concentration of structures,facilities, and people that form the economic and cultural focus for the surrounding area.Operations are affected by all five categories of urban areas. Cities, metropolises, andmegalopolises with associated urban sprawl cover hundreds of square kilometers.Brigades and below normally operate in these urban areas as part of a larger force.Extensive combat in these urban areas involves units of division level and above.
• Villages (population of 3,000 inhabitants or less). The brigade’s area ofoperations (AO) may contain many villages. Battalions and companiesbypass, move through, defend from, and attack objectives within villages as anormal part of brigade operations.
• Towns (population of over 3,000 to 100,000 inhabitants and not part of amajor urban complex). Operations in such areas normally involve brigades ordivisions. Brigades may bypass, move through, defend in, or attack enemyforces in towns as part of division operations.
• City (population over 100,000 to 1 million inhabitants).
• Metropolis (population over 1 million to 10 million inhabitants).
• Megalopolis (population over 10 million inhabitants).
e. Conditions of Urban Operations. Due to political and societal changes that havetaken place in the late twentieth century, advances in technology, and the Army’sgrowing role in maintaining regional stability, UO is conducted across the full spectrumof offense, defense, stability, and support. The full spectrum of UO will affect how unitsmust plan and execute their assigned missions. The enemy’s actions significantly affectthe conditions of UO, which may transition from one condition to another rapidly. Unitsmay be conducting operations under different conditions at two locations at the sametime. The following definitions of the three general conditions of UO provide clarity,focus, and a mental framework for commanders and leaders conducting tactical planningfor UO.
small-scale personnel seizures or arrests, focused psychological or civil affairsoperations, or recovery operations. They may closely resemble US police operations byspecial weapons and tactics (SWAT) teams. They may even involve cooperation betweenUS forces and host nation police. Though conventional units may not be directly involvedin the actual operation, they may support it by isolating the area or providing security orcrowd control.
(2) Urban Operations Under Precision Conditions. Under precision conditions,either the threat is thoroughly mixed with noncombatants or political considerationsrequire the use of combat power to be significantly more restrictive than UO underhigh-intensity conditions. Infantry units must routinely expect to operate under precisionconditions, especially during stability and support operations.
(a) UO under precision conditions normally involve combat action, usually involvingclose combat. Some of this combat can be quite violent for short periods. It is marked,however, by the conscious acceptance by US forces of the need to focus and sometimesrestrain the combat power used. The commander may bring overwhelming force to bear,but only on specific portions of the urban area occupied by the threat. He may choosedifferent TTP in order to remain within the bounds of the more restrictive ROE. TighterROE demands strict accountability of individual and unit actions.
(b) When preparing for UO under precision conditions, commanders and leadersmust realize that not only may the ROE change, but the TTP may change also. Thesechanges require that soldiers be given time to train for the specific operation. Forexample, when clearing a room, units may modify the procedure of first throwing agrenade (fragmentation, concussion, stun) into the room before entering. This proceduremay be done to lessen the possible casualties among noncombatants interspersed with theenemy. (See Chapter 3 for more information.)
(3) Urban Operations Under High-Intensity Conditions. These conditions includecombat actions against a determined enemy occupying prepared positions or conductingplanned attacks. UO under high-intensity conditions require the coordinated applicationof the full combat power of the joint combined arms team. Infantry units must beprepared at all times to conduct violent combat under conditions of high-intensity UO.
(a) An Infantry unit’s mission is normally to seize, clear, or defend urban terrain,engaging and defeating the enemy by using whatever force is necessary. Although thechanging world situation may have made high-intensity UO less likely, it represents thehigh end of the combat spectrum, and units must be trained for it.
(b) Urban combat under high-intensity conditions is the most stressful of alloperations in urban areas and can be casualty-intensive for both sides. Even though thefully integrated firepower of the joint combined arms team is being used, commandersmust still prevent unnecessary collateral damage and casualties among noncombatants.
f. Stability Operations and Support Operations. The Army has furthercategorized military operations other than war (MOOTW) as stability and supportoperations. Units conduct these operations, which are normally short of actual combat, tosupport national policy. Recent examples include famine relief operations in Mogadishu,Somalia; evacuation of noncombatants in Monrovia, Liberia; and peace enforcementin Bosnia.
accomplishes these activities through execution of tactical missions, such as securitypatrols, establishing roadblocks and checkpoints, base defense, and so forth.
(b) While stability and support operations can occur anywhere, they will most likelyoccur in an urban environment. These operations can resemble UO under precisionconditions and can easily transition into combat operations. (Additional TTP and lessonplans are contained in Chapter 14 of TC 7-98-1, Stability and Support TrainingSupport Package.)
g. Confusion and Crossover Between Conditions. As in Mogadishu, many typesof operations may occur at the same time and certain types of operations can easily betransformed into others by enemy actions. The specific type of conditions may not havemuch meaning to the individual soldier, but the ROE must be understood and adhered toby all.
1-2. FULL SPECTRUM OPERATIONS/URBAN OPERATIONS CONCEPT
[image:16.612.92.485.355.652.2]
The UO are conducted within the operational framework of decisive, shaping, andsustaining operations (FM 3-0[FM 100-5]). Army units will conduct offensive, defensive,stability, and support (ODSS) operations within the operational framework shown inFigure 1-1. These operations comprise the spectrum of UO that a brigade must beprepared to conduct (Figure 1-2).
a. Army operational commanders assigned to conduct UO—
• Continually assess the urban environment to determine effects on operations.
• Conduct shaping operations that emphasize isolation and set the conditions fordecisive operations.
• Dominate through simultaneous and or sequential operations that establishand maintain preeminent military control over the enemy, geographical area,or population.
• Plan for and execute transitions between mission types and forces, andultimately to the control of a non-Army agency.
[image:17.612.130.515.282.579.2]
b. Brigades must plan for and be prepared to conduct UO within the operationalconcept shown in Figure 1-2, which depicts the potential simultaneity of UO. Brigadesmust be prepared to transition from one type of ODSS operation to another. Howbrigades prepare for and execute ODSS operations will be determined by the factors ofMETT-TC. (Within mission considerations, the ROE will have significant importance.)
Figure 1-2. UO spectrum of operations/operational concept.
1-3. TACTICAL CHALLENGES
Companies, platoons and squads do not normally operate independently while conductingUO. The battalions to which they are assigned will face a number of challenges duringthe planning and execution of UO. The most likely challenges that units will face arediscussed below.
areas of operations (AO). They may be required to command and control subordinateunits and elements over extended distances, which may include deploying subordinatebattalions and companies individually in support of operations outside the brigade’simmediate AO.
NOTE: Under the IBCT concept companies may operate independently.
(1) Contiguous operations are conducted in an AO that facilitates mutual support ofcombat, combat support (CS), and combat service support (CSS) elements. They havetraditional linear features including identifiable, contiguous frontages and sharedboundaries between forces. Contiguous operations are characterized by relatively closedistances between subordinate units and elements.
(2) In noncontiguous operations, subordinate units may operate in isolated pockets,connected only through the integrating effects of an effective concept of operations.Noncontiguous operations place a premium on initiative, effective informationoperations, decentralized security operations, and innovative logistics measures. Theymake mutual support of combat, CS, and CSS elements complicated, or hinder it byextended distances between subordinate units and elements.
b. Symmetrical and Asymmetrical Threats. In addition to being required to facesymmetrical threats, the brigade must be prepared to face threats of an asymmetricalnature.
(1) Symmetrical threats are generally “linear” in nature and include those threats thatspecifically confront the brigade’s combat power and capabilities. Examples ofsymmetrical threats include conventional enemy forces conducting offensive or defensiveoperations against friendly forces.
(2) Asymmetrical threats are those that are specifically designed to avoidconfrontation with the brigade’s combat power and capabilities. These threats may usethe civilian population and infrastructure to shield their capabilities from fires.Asymmetric threats may also attack the brigade and civilian population with weapons ofmass destruction (WMD). Asymmetrical threats are most likely to be based in urbanareas to take advantage of the density of civilian population and infrastructure. Examplesof asymmetrical threats include terrorist attacks; EW, to include computer-based systems;criminal activity; guerilla warfare; and environmental attacks.
c. Minimization of Collateral Damage and Noncombatant Casualties. Acondition that commanders and leaders will be required to confront during urbanoperations will be minimizing collateral damage and noncombatant casualties. This willhave to be balanced with mission accomplishment and the requirement to provide forceprotection. Commanders must be aware of the ROE and be prepared to requestmodifications when the tactical situation requires them. Changes in ROE must be rapidlydisseminated throughout the brigade. Commanders and leaders must ensure that changesto the ROE are clearly understood by all soldiers within the brigade.
that may deteriorate. An escalation to combat is a clear indicator that the stability orsupport operation failed. Units must always retain the ability to conduct offensive anddefensive operations. Preserving the ability to transition allows units to maintain initiativewhile providing force protection. Subordinate commanders and leaders must be fullytrained to recognize activities that would initiate this transition.
(1) Balanced Mindset. A balance must be achieved between the mindset of peaceoperations and the mindset of war fighting. Soldiers cannot become too complacent intheir warrior spirit, but also must not be too eager to rely on the use of force to resolveconflict. This balance is the essence of stability operations and the fundamental aspectthat will enable the unit to perform its mission successfully and avoid an escalation tocombat. Proactive leaders that are communicating and enforcing the ROE areinstrumental to achieving this mindset.
(2) Combat Skills Training. If the stability or support operation extends overprolonged periods of time, training should be planned that focuses on the individual andcollective combat tasks that would be performed during transition to offensive and ordefensive missions.
1-4. IMPORTANCE OF URBAN AREAS
Urban areas are the centers of finance, politics, transportation, communication, industry,society, and culture. Therefore, they have often been scenes of important militaryoperations, both combat and noncombat. Today, more than ever before, UO will beconducted by joint forces (Table 1-1, page 1-8).
CITY YEAR CITY YEAR
RIGA 1917 *SEOUL 1950
MADRID 1936 BUDAPEST 1956
WARSAW 1939 *BEIRUT 1958
ROTTERDAM 1940 *SANTO DOMINGO 1965
MOSCOW 1942 *SAIGON 1968
STALINGRAD 1942 *KONTUM 1968
LENINGRAD 1942 *HUE 1968
WARSAW 1943 BELFAST 1972
*PALERMO 1944 MONTEVIDEO 1972
*BREST 1944 QUANGTRI CITY 1972
*AACHEN 1944 SUEZ CITY 1973
ARNHEM 1945 XUAN LOC 1975
ORTONA 1944 SAIGON 1975
*CHERBOURG 1944 BEIRUT 1975
BRESLAU 1945 MANAGUA 1978
*WEISSENFELS 1945 ZAHLE 1981
BERLIN 1945 TYRE 1982
*MANILA 1945 *BEIRUT 1983
JERUSALEM 1967 NICOSIA 1958
*SAN MANUEL 1945 SIDON 1982
ALGIERS 1954 *COLON 1989
CARACAS 1958 *MOGADISHU 1993
*PANAMA CITY 1989 *KUWAIT CITY 1991
*GRENADA 1983 *MONROVIA 1994
*PORT AU PRINCE 1996 *SARAJEVO 1996
*BRCKO 1997
[image:20.612.120.458.70.331.2]
*Direct US troop involvement.
Table 1-1. Cities contested during twentieth century conflicts.
b. Operations in urban areas are conducted to capitalize on the strategic and tacticaladvantages of the city, and to deny those advantages to the enemy. Often, the side thatcontrols a city has a psychological or political advantage, which can be enough tosignificantly affect the outcome of larger conflicts.
c. Even during normally less violent stability operations, such as peacekeeping,combat can occur in cities. In developing nations, control of only a few cities is often thekey to control of national resources. The US city riots of the 1960’s and the guerrilla andterrorist operations in Santo Domingo, Caracas, Belfast, Managua, Mogadishu, andBeirut indicate the many situations that can occur as a result of UO.
d. Urban areas also affect military operations because of the way they alter theterrain. In the last 40 years, cities have expanded, losing their well-defined boundaries asthey extended into the countryside. New road systems have opened areas to make thempassable. Highways, canals, and railroads have been built to connect population centers.Industries have grown along those connectors, creating strip areas. Rural areas, althoughretaining much of their farm-like character, are connected to the towns by a network ofsecondary roads.
Populations have dramatically increased in existing cities and urban sprawl has led to theincreased number of slums and shantytowns within those urban areas. In many cases, thisurbanization has occurred close to the seacoast, since the interior of many third worldnations is undeveloped or uninhabitable.
Figure 1-3. Urban areas blocking maneuver areas.
f. Extensive urbanization provides conditions that a threat force can exploit. Usedwith mobile forces on the adjacent terrain, conventional threat forces with antitankcapabilities defending from urban areas can dominate avenues of approach, greatlyimproving the overall strength of the defense. Asymmetrical threats can use urban areasto offset US technological and firepower advantages.
g. Forces operating in such areas may have elements in open terrain, villages, towns,or small and large cities. Each of these areas calls for different tactics, task organization,fire support, and CSS.
1-5. FUNDAMENTALS OF URBAN OPERATIONS
The fundamentals described in this paragraph apply to UO regardless of the mission orgeographical location. Some fundamentals may also apply to operations not conducted inan urban environment, but are particularly relevant in an environment dominated bymanmade structures and a dense noncombatant population. Brigade and battalioncommanders and staffs should use these fundamentals when planning UO.
negative impacts. Under media scrutiny, the actions of a single soldier may havesignificant strategic implications. The goal of information operations is to ensure that theinformation available to all interested parties, the public, the media, and other agencies, isaccurate and placed in the proper context of the Army’s mission. While manyinformation operations will be planned at levels above the brigade, tactical unitsconducting UO may often be involved in the execution of information operations such asmilitary deception, operations security (OPSEC), physical security, and psychologicaloperations. Brigades and battalions must conduct aggressive intelligence, security, andreconnaissance operations that will allow them to properly apply the elements of assess,shape, dominate, and transition to specific UO.
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b. Conduct Close Combat. Close combat is required in offensive and defensiveUO. The capability must be present and visible in stability UO and may be required, byexception, in support UO. Close combat in any UO is resource intensive, requiresproperly trained and equipped forces, has the potential for high casualties, and canachieve decisive results when properly conducted. Units must always be prepared toconduct close combat as part of UO (Figure 1-4).
Figure 1-4. Soldiers conducting close combat in an urban area.
c. Avoid the Attrition Approach. Previous doctrine was inclined towards asystematic linear approach to urban combat. This approach placed an emphasis onstandoff weapons and firepower. It can result in significant collateral damage, a lengthyoperation, and be inconsistent with the political situation and strategic objectives. Enemyforces that defend urban areas often want units to adopt this approach because of thelikely costs in resources. Commanders should only consider this tactical approach tourban combat only when the factors of METT-TC warrant its use.
conserve it. This implies risk in those areas where units choose not to exercise control inorder to be able to mass overwhelming power where it is needed.
Figure 1-5. Military airbase, an example of key terrain.
e. Minimize Collateral Damage. Units should use precision standoff fires,information operations, and nonlethal tactical systems to the greatest extent possibleconsistent with mission accomplishment. Operational commanders must develop uniqueROE for each UO and provide necessary firepower restrictions. Information operationsand nonlethal systems may compensate for some of these required restrictions, especiallyin stability operations and support operations. Moreover, commanders must consider theshort and long term effects of firepower on the population, the infrastructure, andsubsequent missions.
f. Separate Combatants from Noncombatants. Promptly separatingnoncombatants from combatants may make the operation more efficient and diminishsome of the enemy’s asymmetrical advantages. Separation of noncombatants may alsoreduce some of the restrictions on the use of firepower and enhance force protection. Thisimportant task becomes more difficult when the adversary is an unconventional force andcan mix with the civil population.
h. Preserve Critical Infrastructure. Brigade and battalion commanders and staffsmay have to analyze the urban area to identify critical infrastructure. Attempts to preservethe critical elements for post-combat sustainment operations, stability operations, supportoperations, or the health and well-being of the indigenous population may be required.Urban areas remain in the AO after combat operations have ceased and post-combat UOmay be unavoidable. This requirement differs from simply avoiding collateral damage inthat units may have to initiate actions to prevent adversaries from removing or destroyinginfrastructure that will be required in the future. In some cases, preserving criticalinfrastructure may be the assigned objective of the UO.
i. Understand the Human Dimension. Brigade and battalion commanders andstaffs may have to carefully consider and manage the allegiance and morale of thecivilian population that may decisively affect operations. The assessment of the urbanenvironment must identify clearly and accurately the attitudes of the urban populationtoward units. Guidance to subordinates covering numerous subjects including ROE, forceprotection, logistics operations, and fraternization, is part of this assessment. Brigade andbattalion commanders and staffs may also be required to consider the demographicvariance in the attitudes of an urban population. Western cultural norms may not beappropriate if applied to a nonwestern urban population. Commanders and staffs mustmake their assessments based on a thorough understanding and appreciation of the localsocial and cultural norms of the population. Sound policies, discipline, and considerationwill positively affect the attitudes of the population toward Army forces. Additionally,well-conceived information operations can also enhance the position of units relative tothe urban population. Even during combat operations against a conventional enemy force,the sensitivity and awareness of units toward the civilian population will affect the postcombat situation. The human dimension of the urban environment often has the mostsignificance and greatest potential for affecting the outcome of UO.
j. Transition Control. UO of all types are resource intensive and thus commandersmust plan to conclude UO expediently, yet consistent with successful missionaccomplishment. The end state of all UO transfers control of the urban area to anotheragency or returns it to civilian control. This requires the successful completion of theArmy force mission and a thorough transition plan. The transition plan may includereturning control of the urban area to another agency a portion at a time as conditionspermit. For brigades and below, transition may also include changing missions fromcombat operations to stability operations or support operations and vice–versa.
1-6. CHARACTERISTICS OF URBAN OPERATIONS
will need to accomplish the mission. Unit goals must be speed, precision, andminimization of soldiers in close combat with the enemy. The greatest threats might besnipers, grenade launchers, booby traps, and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs). Soldierscan expect booby traps on doorways and windows and on entrances to undergroundpassageways.
a. Changing Conditions. Platoons and squads may find themselves executingmissions in changing conditions during UO. The change from stability and supportoperations to combat operations and vice-versa will often change conditions fromhigh-intensity to precision or the opposite. METT-TC factors and the ROE determine thischange. ROE changes are normally made at echelons much higher than company andbattalion, but they normally require that units modify the way they fight in urban areas.Squads and platoons will be required to select different TTP based on the conditions theyface. The ROE will ultimately determine these conditions for the Infantry platoon andsquad.
b. Small-Unit Battles. Units fighting in urban areas often become isolated or feellike they are isolated, making combat a series of small-unit battles. Soldiers and squad orteam leaders must have the initiative, skill, and courage to accomplish their missionswhile isolated from their parent units. A skilled, well-trained defender has tacticaladvantages over the attacker in this type of combat. The defender may occupy strongcovered and concealed static positions and conduct three-tier ambushes, whereas theattacker must be exposed in order to advance. Greatly reduced line-of-sight ranges,built-in obstacles, and compartmented terrain may require the commitment of moretroops for a given frontage. While the defense of an urban area can be conductedeffectively with relatively small numbers of troops, the troop density required for anattack in urban areas may be greater than for an attack in open terrain. Individual soldiersmust be trained and psychologically ready for this type of operation.
c. Communications. Urban operations require centralized planning anddecentralized execution. Therefore, effective vertical and horizontal communications arecritical. Leaders must trust their subordinates’ initiative and skill, which can only occurthrough training. The state of a unit’s training and cohesion are vital, decisive factors inthe execution of operations in urban areas.
(1) Structures and a high concentration of electrical power lines normally degraderadio communications in urban areas. Many buildings are constructed so that radio waveswill not pass through them. Frequently, units may not have enough radios tocommunicate with subordinate elements as they enter buildings and move through urbancanyons and defiles.
(2) Visual signals may also be used but are often not effective because of thescreening effects of buildings, walls, and so forth. Signals must be planned, widelydisseminated, and understood by all assigned, attached, or OPCON units. Increased noisemakes the effective use of sound signals difficult. Verbal signals may also reveal theunit’s location and intent to the enemy.
offensive operations, if assets are available. However, wire communications can often becut by falling debris, exploding munitions, and moving vehicles.
d. Noncombatants. Urban areas, by their very nature, are population centers.Noncombatants will be present and will affect both friendly and threat courses of actionacross the spectrum of UO. Besides the local inhabitants, refugees, governmental andNGOs, and the international media are likely to be present. For example, during thefighting in Grozny, 150,000 refugees were added to a prefight population of 450,000.There were 50,000 civilian casualties during the fight. Units must be prepared to dealwith all categories of noncombatants
e. High Expenditure of Ammunition. Units conducting UO use large quantities ofammunition because of short ranges, limited visibility, briefly exposed targets, constantengagements, and requirements for suppression. AT4s, rifle and machine gunammunition, 40-mm grenades, hand grenades, and explosives are high-usage items in thistype of fighting. When possible, those items should be either stockpiled or broughtforward on-call, so that they are easily available.
f. Increased Casualties. More casualties occur because of shattered glass, fallingdebris, rubble, ricochets, urban fires, and falls from heights. Difficulty in maintainingsituational awareness also contributes to this problem because of increased risks offratricide. Stress-related casualties and nonbattle injuries resulting from illnesses orenvironmental hazards, such as contaminated water, toxic industrial materials (TIM), andso forth, also increase the number of casualties.
g. Limited Mounted Maneuver Space. Buildings, street width, rubble, debris, andnoncombatants all contribute to limited mounted maneuver space inside urban areas.Armored vehicles will rarely be able to operate inside an urban area without Infantrysupport.
h. Three-Dimensional Terrain. Friendly and threat forces will conduct operationsin a three-dimensional battle space. Engagements can occur on the surface, above thesurface, or below the surface of the urban area. Additionally, engagements can occurinside and outside of buildings. Multistory buildings will present the additionalpossibility of different floors within the same structure being controlled by either friendlyor threat forces.
i. Collateral Damage. Depending on the nature of the operation and METT-TCfactors, significant collateral damage may occur, especially under conditions ofhigh-intensity UO. Commanders and leaders must ensure that ROE are disseminated andenforced.
j. Reliance on Human Intelligence. Until technological advancements providemore effective ways of gathering information, there is an increased need for humanintelligence (HUMINT). Reconnaissance efforts of battalion and brigade assets can assistas well as the shaping operations of division or joint task force assets. Companies andbelow normally have to continue to rely on information provided to them from humansources.
for stability and support operations, when the main effort may not necessarily consist ofcombat units.
l. Need to Isolate Critical Points. During offensive operations, companies,platoons, and squads will be assaulting buildings and clearing rooms. More often, assetswill not exist to isolate large portions of the urban area. Therefore, skillful use of directand indirect fires, obscurants, and maneuver must occur to isolate key buildings orportions of buildings in order to secure footholds and clear.
m. Snipers. Historically, snipers have had increased utility in urban areas. They canprovide long- and short-range precision fires and can be used effectively to assistcompany- and platoon-level isolation efforts. Snipers also have provided precision firesduring stability operations. Along with engaging assigned targets, snipers are a valuableasset to the commander for providing observation along movement routes andsuppressive fires during an assault.
n. Support by Fire Positions. Buildings, street width, rubble, debris, andnoncombatants all dictate the positioning and fields of fire for crew-served and keyweapons in urban areas.
1-7. URBAN BATTLE SPACE
Urban areas mainly consist of man-made features such as buildings that provide coverand concealment, limit fields of observation and fire, and block movement of forces,especially mechanized or armored forces. Thick-walled buildings provide ready-made,fortified positions. Thin-walled buildings may have fields of observation and fire thatmay prove important. Another important aspect is that urban areas complicate, confuseand degrade the commander’s ability to identify and control his forces. All these factorswill influence the urban battle space.
a. Commanders and leaders can enhance situational understanding by maintaining aclear understanding of their urban battle space (Figure 1-6, page 1-16). Urban battlespace includes:
(1) Urban Airspace. Airspace provides a rapid avenue of approach into an urbanarea. While aviation assets are unaffected by obstacles such as rubble, vehicles, orconstructed barriers, they must consider power lines, towers, sign poles, and billboardswhen flying. Task force reconnaissance elements can locate, identify, and report theseobstacles to allow for improved flight planning.
(2) Supersurface (Tops of Buildings). The term “supersurface” refers only to the top,roof, or apex of a structure. These areas can provide cover and concealment, limit orenhance observation and fields of fire, and, depending on the situation, enhance, restrict,canalize, or block movement. Supersurface areas can also provide concealed positions forsnipers, automatic weapons, light and medium antitank weapons, and man-portable airdefense systems. In many cases, they enable top-down attacks against the weakest pointsof armored vehicles and unsuspecting aircraft.
concealment. Additionally, the intrasurface areas provide mobility corridors within andbetween structures at upper levels for both friendly and enemy forces. Intrasurface areasmay also provide concealed locations for snipers, automatic weapons, light and mediumantitank weapons, and man-portable air defense systems. In many cases, they enable top-down attacks against the weakest points of armored vehicles and unsuspecting aircraft.
(4) Surface (Ground, Street, and Water Level). Streets are usually avenues ofapproach. Streets and open areas provide a rapid approach for ground movement in urbanterrain. Units moving along streets can be canalized by buildings and have little space formaneuver, while approaching across large open areas such as parks, athletic fields andparking areas. Streets also expose forces to observation and engagement by enemyelements. Obstacles on streets in towns are usually more effective than those on roads inopen terrain since they are more difficult to bypass.
(5) Subsurface (Underwater and Subterranean). Common subsurface areas, whichinclude subways, sewers, public utility systems, and cellars, can be used as avenues ofmovement for dismounted elements. Both attacker and defender can use subterraneanroutes to outflank or turn the opposition, or to conduct infiltration, ambushes,counterattacks, and sustaining operations. Subsurface systems in some urban areas areeasily overlooked but can be important to the outcome of operations.
b. Commanders and leaders must be able to identify building types, constructionmaterials, and building design and must understand the effectiveness and limitations ofweapons against these factors. (See Chapters 3 and 8.) They must also understand thaturban combat will require them to visualize a three-dimensional battle space.Commanders and leaders must be aware of how their urban battle space is changing asfriendly and enemy forces and civilians move, and as weather and environmentalconditions change. They can react to changes within the their battle space with the timelymovement of assault, support, and breaching elements in the offense; repositioning ofplatoons and squads in the defense; and synchronization of CS and CSS assets. Otherfactors that impact battle space are:
• CASEVAC and resupply procedures.
• Handling EPWs and noncombatants.
• Rules of engagement. (See Appendix A.)
• Battlefield obscuration.
• Communications.
• Movement of vehicles. (How will the battle space affect movement and targetengagement?)
Section II. SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS
Employment of weapons, target engagements, munitions and equipment, noncombatants,disease prevention, stress, fratricide avoidance, situational awareness, the media, andunexploded ordnance all require special consideration when conducting combat in urbanareas. (See Appendixes B, C, D, and E for additional special considerations.)
1-8. WEAPONS CONSIDERATIONS
The characteristics and nature of combat in urban areas affect the employment ofweapons. Commanders and leaders at all levels must consider the followingconsiderations in various combinations when choosing their weapons. (See Chapter 7 fordetailed discussion of specific weapons.)
WARNING
Protecting personnel from backblast orfragmentation effects must be considered whenfighting in urban areas.
round is a round or fragment that strikes a surface at such a steep angle that it glances offand continues to travel parallel to that surface.)
b. Engagement ranges are close. Studies and historical analyses have shown thatonly 5 percent of all targets are more than 100 meters away. About 90 percent of alltargets are located 50 meters or less from the identifying soldier. Few personnel targetswill be visible beyond 50 meters and they usually occur at 35 meters or less. Engagementtimes are short. Enemy personnel present only fleeting targets.
c. Depression and elevation limits for some weapons create dead space. Tallbuildings form deep canyons that are often safe from indirect fires. Some weapons canfire rounds to ricochet behind cover and inflict casualties. Target engagement fromoblique angles, both horizontal and vertical, demands superior marksmanship skills.
d. Smoke from burning buildings, dust from explosions, shadows from tallbuildings, and the lack of light penetrating inner rooms all combine to reduce visibilityand increase a sense of isolation. Added to this is the masking of fires caused by rubbleand manmade structures. Targets, even those at close range, tend to be indistinct.
e. Urban fighting can become confused mêlées with several small units attacking onconverging axes. The risks from friendly fires, ricochets, and fratricide must beconsidered during the planning phase of operations, and control measures must beadjusted to lower these risks. Soldiers and leaders must maintain a sense of situationalawareness.
f. The soldier and target may be inside or outside buildings, or they may both beinside the same or separate buildings. The enclosed nature of combat in urban areasmeans that all the weapon’s effects including the muzzle blast and backblast, must beconsidered as well as the round’s impact on the target.
g. Usually the man-made structure must be attacked before enemy personnel insideare attacked. Therefore, the decision to employ specific weapons and demolitions willoften be based on their effects against masonry and concrete rather than against enemypersonnel.
h. Modern engineering and design improvements mean that most large buildingsconstructed since World War II are resilient to the blast effects of bomb and artilleryattack. Even though modern buildings may burn easily, they often retain their structuralintegrity and remain standing. Once high-rise buildings burn out, they may still havemilitary utility and are almost impossible to damage further. A large structure can take 24to 48 hours to burn out and become cool enough for soldiers to enter.
1-9. TARGET ENGAGEMENT
Most target engagements in urban areas are at ground level and above ground level. Thefollowing characteristics are considered when engaging targets.
friend or foe. The Infantry uses mostly light and medium antitank weapons, automaticrifles, machine guns, and hand grenades. Opportunities for using antitank guided missilesmay be restricted because of the short ranges involved and the many obstructions thatinterfere with missile flight. Danger close is normal for use of indirect fires in mostfirefights.
b. Above Ground Level. Tall buildings and aircraft provide opportunities toobserve and engage targets from much longer ranges than from ground-level positions.However, target exposures may still be very short because of the multiplicity of coveravailable to the enemy on the ground. Observers positioned on very high buildingssometimes feel that they are able to observe everything in their area of operations andexperience a false sense of security. In fact, even observers in good above-groundpositions are often limited in their ability to see much of what is occurring. Aerialobservers are very useful during urban operations. Helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft,such as the AC 130 Spector gunship or the P-3 Orion, carry sophisticated sensors that cangreatly improve the ability to observe in the urban area. They can vary their viewingangles and altitudes to obtain a better view around and over buildings, but they cannotremain stationary for any length of time and must depart the area periodically to refuel. Acommander’s best course of action is to integrate both ground level and above groundlevel observers to obtain the most complete picture of the situation.
1-10. MUNITIONS AND EQUIPMENT
Because of the recurring need for reconnaissance by fire and intense suppression, theshort engagement ranges, and limited visibility, forces engaged in fighting in urban areasuse large quantities of munitions. In appropriate situations, nonlethal munitions anddevices, such as stun grenades, riot control agents (when authorized by the nationalcommand authority), pepper spray, and personnel restraints, may also be high use items.Units committed to combat in urban areas may need special equipment such as: grapplinghooks, rope, snaplinks, collapsible pole ladders, rope ladders, poleless litters, constructionmaterial, axes, sledge hammers, pry bars, and sandbags. Protective equipment such asknee and elbow pads, heavy gloves, and ballistic eyewear will significantly increase themobility of Infantrymen in urban combat. When possible, those items should bestockpiled or brought forward on-call, so they are readily available to soldiers.
1-11. NONCOMBATANTS
Unless combat has been taking place in an urban area for an extended period of time,units will encounter large numbers of noncombatants. Noncombatants may beencountered during offensive operations as a result of clearing buildings and city blocksor when preparing for defensive operations. The nature of stability and support operationswill most likely result in having to deal with noncombatants. Units will have to knowwhether to expect noncombatants to be friendly, neutral, or hostile and know how to dealwith them. Handling noncombatants can be as simple as moving them out of immediateharm’s way or as complicated as noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO).
a. Definitions. Definitions that apply are discussed below.
(2) Noncombatants. Noncombatants are civilians in the area of operations who arenot armed and are not taking an active part in the hostilities in a way that poses a directthreat to US personnel. Noncombatants can include refugees, local inhabitants affectedby operations, civilian personnel belonging to US governmental agencies, civilianpersonnel from NGOs, and media personnel. Military chaplains, medical personnel,prisoners of war, and the wounded and sick are also noncombatants.
(3) Prisoners of War. A prisoner of war (PW) is an individual, such as a member ofthe armed forces or militia, a person who accompanies the armed forces without being amember, or other category of person defined in the Geneva Convention Relative to theTreatment of Prisoners of War, who has fallen into the power of the enemy.
(4) Detained Personnel. A detained person is any individual who is in custody forcommitting hostile acts against US forces or committing serious criminal acts.
(5) Dislocated Civilian. This is a broad term that includes a displaced person, anevacuee, an expellee, or a refugee (Figure 1-7).
(a) Displaced Person. A displaced person is a civilian who is involuntarily outsidethe national boundaries of his country.
(b) Evacuee. An evacuee is a civilian removed from a place of residence by militarydirection for reasons of personal security or the requirements of the military situation.
(c) Expellee. An expellee is a civilian outside the boundaries of the country of hisnationality or ethnic origin who is being forcibly repatriated to that country or to a thirdcountry for political or other purposes.
(d) Refugee. A refugee is a civilian who, by reason of real or imagined danger, hasleft home to seek safety elsewhere.
Figure 1-7. Dislocated civilians.
political opponents of US involvement may be hostile towards the US militarypresence but do not pose a threat to US forces.
b. Noncombatants and Rules of Engagement. All leaders and soldiers mustunderstand the potential urban battlefield and the fact that they will most likely encounternoncombatants. If soldiers must deal with noncombatants, they should refer to their ROE.ROE should be very specific on treatment of each type of noncombatant [paragraph a(2)].c. Communication with Civilians. Soldiers should learn basic commands andphrases in the language most common to their area of operations. When giving thesecommands or phrases, they should speak loudly and clearly at a normal rate and usegestures whenever possible. All soldiers should be given a basic language translationcard. (See example in Table 1-2.)
ENGLISH WORD ORPHRASE
FOREIGN WORD ORPHRASE
PRONUNCIATION
HALT
WHAT IS YOUR NAME?STAND UP
WALKSIT DOWN
YOU WILL BE SEARCHEDNOWDON’T TALKYESNONOT PERMITTEDMEDICAL AIDFOODWATER
USE THE LATRINE?
Table 1-2. Example of basic language translation card.
d. Cultural Issues. Soldiers must be educated on the types of cultural issues thatmay offend the local inhabitants. For example, a gesture that may be innocent toAmericans may deeply insult the inhabitants.
e. Considerations for Handling Noncombatants. Commanders and leaders shouldconsider using CA, PSYOP, MPs, chaplains, and civil leaders and authorities, whenavailable, if their mission involves handling noncombatants. Other considerations includethe following:
(1) Carefully analyze the ROE concerning when deadly force can be used and whattype of weapons may be employed (for example, using lethal as opposed to nonlethalweapons and capabilities).
(3) When conducting offensive operations, plan to move any noncombatants awayfrom firefights. Normally this task will be given to the support element after rooms andbuildings have been secured. When available, PSYOP, CA, and MPs can assist with thistask. A covered and concealed location away from the immediate combat area should bechosen. Noncombatants should be controlled and not permitted to enter the immediatecombat area, unless they have been cleared to do so and will not compromise combatoperations (for example, media personnel or governmental or NGO personnel that have areason and authority to enter the combat area).
(4) When conducting defensive operations, plan to move noncombatants away fromthe immediate combat area. Companies and below are normally escort personnel to adesignated location where they are turned over to civil authority, battalion, or highercontrol. In many cases, friendly or nonhostile civilians may be directed to a clearing pointand allowed to go there without escort.
(5) Security is not normally provided for media or NGO personnel if they arepermitted in the immediate combat area. Security requirements for civilians should beclarified at the mission briefing.
(6) Based on the factors of METT-TC, units may have to render some type ofimmediate humanitarian assistance (medical attention and feeding). Any plan thatprovides for the provision of medical care to the civilian population must be developed inconjunction with the staff judge advocate. If this type of assistance is necessary, clarifyquestions in the mission briefing. Battalion and brigade staffs can plan for and bringforward additional Class VIII and Class I, as appropriate.
f. Determining the Status of Personnel. Companies and below do not determinethe status of individuals in the combat area. Any persons that are initially detained shouldbe treated as PWs, and higher headquarters should be notified with a request forassistance in evacuating these individuals.
1-12. DISEASE PREVENTION
Many third world countries have poor sewage and refuse removal, as well as low-qualitywater supplies. Even cities with the most modern facilities revert quickly to substandardsanitation and have problems with disease when utilities are interrupted by naturalcatastrophes or urban combat. Exposure to disease can decimate a unit as quickly ascombat. Normal field sanitation may be difficult due to lack of water and the inability todig. Water utilities may not be working due to destruction of the water facilities, lack ofpower, or the lack of experienced personnel to run them. Even if the water is running, itcannot be expected to have been properly treated. Commanders and leaders must ensurethat soldiers drink water only from designated sources or utilize water purificationmethods. Additionally, first sergeants must coordinate with the battalion S4 for wasteremoval and latrine facilities, if applicable. Medics must constantly monitor soldiers in anurban area for signs of disease or illness, and provide appropriate medical attention.
1-13. STRESS
requires consideration for the soldiers’ and small-unit leaders’ morale and the unit’sesprit de corps. Rotating units that have been committed to heavy combat for longperiods can reduce stress. Soldiers conducting combat operations must perform complexcollective and individual tasks without adequate sleep and under stress. Commanders andleaders must be aware of what can cause stress, minimize those factors to the extentpossible, and take every opportunity to rest soldiers. The following cause stress in combatand may be intensified in the urban environment.
a. Anxiety. The fear and anticipation of the unknown can have devastating effectson the mental and physical wellbeing of a person. Soldiers may experience the fear ofdeath or being wounded or, because of the three-dimensional battlefield, the possibility ofbeing engaged from all directions simultaneously. A lack of communication with othersmay cause a feeling of isolation and vulnerability.
b. Intense Noise, Limited Visibility, and Low Light Levels. Smoke, darkness, fog,rain, snow, ice, and glare make it hard to see. The extended wear of night vision goggles,protective masks, or laser protective lenses causes stress. Intense noise not only causesstress by itself, but it further isolates the soldier from human contact and interferes withsituational awareness.
c. Disrupted Wake/Sleep Cycle. A soldier’s performance suffers during normalsleeping hours due to the disruption of the normal schedule.
d. Decision Making and Responsibility for Others. Mental stress results frommaking vital decisions with little time and insufficient information. It is increased duringtimes of great confusion and exposure to danger. Leaders are especially affected by theheavy load of responsibility they carry.
e. Physical Fatigue and Illness. Working the muscles faster than they can besupplied with oxygen and fuel can cause soldiers to function poorly without rest. Minorillnesses that do not completely disable the soldier add to his stress and hinder his abilityto function at his full potential.
f. Physical Discomfort. Extreme cold, heat, wet, or thirst add greatly to the level ofindividual stress. Minor injuries or wounds can cause constant pain that, while notincapacitating to the soldier, add to his stress.
g. Psychological Stress. Commanders and leaders must remain alert for the signs ofpsychological stress. During the fighting in Grozny, 72 percent of the Russian soldiersdemonstrated some kind of psychological disorder symptoms such as insomnia, lack ofmotivation, high anxiety, neuro-emotional stress, fatigue, and hypochondria. Brigade andbattalion surgeons must be prepared for soldiers exhibiting signs of psychological stress.
1-14. FRATRICIDE AVOIDANCE
a. Doctrine. Doctrine provides the basic framework for accomplishing the mission.Commanders and leaders must have a thorough understanding of US doctrine and, ifoperating with other services or nations, joint, combined, and host nation doctrine.
b. Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. TTP provide a “how-to” that everyoneunderstands. TTP are disseminated in doctrinal manuals and standing operatingprocedures (SOPs).
(1) Tactics. Tactics are the employment of units in combat or the orderedarrangement and maneuver of units in relation to each other and or the enemy to use theirfull potential. For example, a company employing support by fire elements from asecured foothold (intermediate objective) prior to conducting the assault on the objective.
(2) Techniques. Techniques are the general and detailed methods used by troops orcommanders to perform assigned missions and functions. Specifically, techniques are themethods of using weapons and personnel. Techniques describe a method, but not the onlymethod. An example is using precision room clearing techniques
(3) Procedures. Procedures are standard, detailed courses of action that describe howto accomplish a task. Examples might be using green colored squares to mark clearedrooms during an assault of a building, or marking each soldier with clear, identifiablemarkings that are IR visible as well.
c. Planning. A simple, flexible maneuver plan that is disseminated to the lowestlevel will aid in the prevention of fratricide. Plans should make the maximum use ofSOPs and battle drills at the user level. They should incorporate adequate controlmeasures and fire support planning and coordination to ensure the safety of friendlytroops and allow changes after execution begins.
d. Execution. The execution of the plan must be monitored, especially with regardto the location of friendly troops and their relationship to friendly fires and the effects ofthose fires on the structural integrity of the building. For example, a fragmentationgrenade used in a weakly constructed building may cause grenade fragments to passthrough walls and injure friendly troops. Additionally, subordinate units must understandthe importance of accurately reporting their position.
e. Rehearsals and Training. The most important factor in preventing fratricide iseffective individual and collective training in the many tasks that support UO. Often theonly combined arms training that will occur are the rehearsals with attached or OPCONassets such as engineers or armored vehicles.
1-15. SITUATIONAL AWARENESS
Situational awareness is the degree to which one is able to maintain a common operatingpicture of all aspects of the tactical situation. This picture includes an understanding ofthe friendly and enemy situation and the urban battle space. Since units will have toconduct operations in changing mission environments, it is imperative for commandersand leaders at all levels to achieve and maintain the best possible degree of situationalawareness. Enhanced situational awareness will enhance lethality, survivability, andoperational tempo.
a. Urban Battle Space. See paragraph 1-7 for detailed information.
b. Questions. To the company level leaders situational awareness means being ableto answer certain questions:
• Where are my soldiers? What is their current status/activity?
• Where are friendlies (adjacent and supporting units)? What is their currentstatus/activity?
• Where is the enemy? What are the enemy’s capabilities?
NOTE: Recent experimentation has shown that situational awareness can be enhancedat the company level and below by using a technique known as “Go Firm.” Ifsituational awareness is unclear, the platoon leader or company commandercan issue the command “Go Firm” over the radio during lulls in contact.Subordinate platoons or squads would assume a hasty defensive posture andask for situation reports (SITREPs) from their squads or fire teams. Theinformation would be sent up the chain of command and clear situationalawareness would be regained prior to continuing the mission.
1-16. MEDIA
Media presence may be pervasive and information management a critical component ofurban operational success.
a Accessibility and Presence. In comparison to other environments (jungles,deserts, mountains, and cold weather areas), urban operations are more accessible to themedia and, therefore, more visible to the world. This is due largely to the presence ofairports, sea and river ports, and major road networks; ready access to power sources andtelecommunications facilities; as well as access to existing local media structures.
b. Complex Relationships. A complex relationship exists among information, thepublic, and policy formulation. Although the degree and manner in which public opinionshapes government policy is uncertain, it has been shown that negative visual images ofmilitary operations presented by the news media can change political objectives and,subsequently, military objectives. As important, media reporting can influence civilianactivity in an urban AO to either the advantage or disadvantage of commandersconducting UO.
